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+# Deep Probe Summary: salmon/minecraft-ui
+
+**Generated:** 2025-07-29  
+**Phase:** P8 — Manual Attack Surface Probe  
+**Status:** Complete  
+**Loops:** 1  
+**Total findings:** 10  
+**CRITICAL:** 1 (P8-003)  
+**HIGH:** 5 (P8-001, P8-002, P8-004, P8-006, P8-009)  
+**MEDIUM:** 3 (P8-005, P8-007, P8-010)  
+**LOW:** 1 (P8-008)  
+
+---
+
+## Probe Methodology
+
+This manual deep probe conducted:
+
+1. **Full source code review** of all 16 Rust source files (1,540+ lines analyzed)
+2. **Attack surface inventory** — 38 HTTP routes catalogued with entry points, sinks, and trust boundaries
+3. **Backward reasoning** — trace from sinks (file write, RCON command, Docker env, SQL) back to attacker inputs
+4. **Contradiction reasoning** — identify gaps between intended security boundaries and actual code
+5. **Cross-model analysis** — chain multiple low-severity issues into higher-severity attack paths
+6. **Verification** — all findings verified with file:line code evidence via read/grep
+
+---
+
+## Finding Summary
+
+| ID | Title | Severity | Category | Attack Vector | Existing Draft |
+|----|-------|----------|----------|---------------|---------------|
+| P8-001 | MOTD Docker Environment Injection | **HIGH** | CWE-77, CWE-93 | Newline injection in MOTD overrides Docker container env vars | Enhanced from p4-016 |
+| P8-002 | RCON Command Injection | **HIGH** | CWE-77, CWE-88 | Unsanitized username in RCON command strings | Updated p4-002 |
+| P8-003 | Instance Name Path Traversal Chain | **CRITICAL** | CWE-22 | `..` in instance name enables arbitrary file write/read/delete | Expanded p4-001 |
+| P8-004 | Level-Seed Properties Injection | **HIGH** | CWE-93, CWE-88 | Seed with newlines injects arbitrary Java properties | Enhanced p4-020 |
+| P8-005 | No Server-Side Session Expiration | **MEDIUM** | CWE-613 | Stolen session cookies never expire | Confirmed p4-004 |
+| P8-006 | Missing CSRF Protection | **HIGH** | CWE-352 | All POST endpoints vulnerable to cross-site request forgery | Confirmed p4-003 |
+| P8-007 | POST /logout Missing Auth Guard | **MEDIUM** | CWE-306 | Logout handler not behind require_auth middleware | Confirmed p4-008 |
+| P8-008 | Weak RCON Password Generation | **LOW** | CWE-338 | thread_rng() used instead of OsRng | Confirmed p4-007 |
+| P8-009 | RCON Password Exposed to All Users | **HIGH** | CWE-200 | rcon_password in edit form for any authenticated user | Confirmed p4-006 |
+| P8-010 | Mod JAR Validation Denial of Service | **MEDIUM** | CWE-770, CWE-674 | Crafted JAR constant pool, no timeout, no recursion limit | Enhanced p4-014 |
+
+---
+
+## Key Findings — Detailed Analysis
+
+### P8-003: Instance Name Path Traversal Chain (CRITICAL)
+
+**The most severe finding.** The instance `name` field is used in 8 different filesystem operations without any sanitization. Rust's `Path::join()` follows `..` components, enabling:
+
+- **Arbitrary directory creation** via `create_dir_all` at instance creation
+- **Arbitrary file write** via mod upload (`fs::write`) and world import (`File::create`)
+- **Arbitrary directory deletion** via `remove_dir_all` at instance deletion
+- **Arbitrary file read** via world export and backup download
+
+The full attack chain:
+1. Create instance with `name=../../../tmp/pwned`
+2. Upload mod/world to write files at `/tmp/pwned/data/mods/evil.so`
+3. Delete instance to remove `/tmp/pwned` directory tree
+
+**Code path:** `src/routes/instances.rs:205` — `Path::join(&form.name)` with no validation → `std::fs::create_dir_all()`
+
+### P8-001: MOTD Docker Environment Injection (HIGH)
+
+The MOTD field is passed directly into Docker container environment variables without newline escaping. Docker treats `\n` in env values as variable delimiters, allowing injection of arbitrary env vars.
+
+**Code path:** `src/docker.rs:128` — `format!("MOTD={}", instance.motd)` → Docker container env → injected vars override security settings like `EULA`, `ONLINE_MODE`.
+
+### P8-002: RCON Command Injection (HIGH)
+
+The `player_action!` macro constructs RCON commands via `format!($command, form.username)` with no sanitization. Spaces, semicolons, and special characters in usernames can inject arbitrary RCON commands.
+
+**Code path:** `src/routes/players.rs:97` — `format!("op {}", form.username)` → `client.send_command_async(cmd)` → Minecraft server console.
+
+### P8-006: Missing CSRF Protection (HIGH)
+
+All 31 POST endpoints lack CSRF tokens. The session cookie uses `SameSite=Lax` which allows cross-site top-level POST navigations. Combined with other findings (path traversal, RCON injection, instance deletion), CSRF enables fully weaponized cross-site attacks.
+
+### P8-009: RCON Password Exposure (HIGH)
+
+The `GET /instances/{id}/edit` endpoint returns `rcon_password` for any instance to any authenticated user. No authorization check beyond `require_auth`.
+
+**Code path:** `src/routes/instances.rs:313` — `rcon_password: row.get(15)?` — rendered in `EditInstanceTemplate`.
+
+### P8-004: Level-Seed Properties Injection (HIGH)
+
+The `seed` field in world regeneration is written to `server.properties` without escaping. Newlines and special characters inject arbitrary Java `.properties` entries.
+
+**Code path:** `src/routes/instances.rs:397` — `format!("level-seed={seed}")` → `std::fs::write(&props_path)`.
+
+---
+
+## Cross-Model Attack Chains
+
+### Chain 1: CSRF + Path Traversal for Full System Compromise
+1. CSRF (P8-006) tricks authenticated admin to create instance with traversed name
+2. Path traversal (P8-003) enables writing arbitrary files outside data directory
+3. Combined impact: full file system write without user interaction
+
+### Chain 2: RCON Password Exposure + Command Injection
+1. Any authenticated user views RCON password (P8-009)
+2. Same user exploits RCON command injection (P8-002) for server compromise
+3. Combined impact: horizontal privilege escalation to Minecraft server operator
+
+### Chain 3: Session Leak + No TTL
+1. Session cookie leaked through any channel (logs, DB backup, etc.)
+2. No server-side TTL (P8-005) means session never expires
+3. POST /logout (P8-007) allows anonymous invalidation of leaked session
+4. Combined impact: indefinite session hijacking window
+
+---
+
+## Coverage Summary
+
+| Entry Point | Finding Coverage | Notes |
+|------------|-----------------|-------|
+| POST /login | P8-006 (CSRF) | No rate limiting finding also relevant |
+| POST /logout | P8-006 (CSRF), P8-007 (Missing Auth) | Not behind require_auth |
+| GET /static/* | None | Safe — static files only |
+| POST /instances/new | P8-003 (Path Traversal), P8-006 (CSRF) | CRITICAL chain |
+| POST /instances/{id}/edit | P8-001 (MOTD injection), P8-006 (CSRF) | Docker env injection path |
+| POST /instances/{id}/delete | P8-003 (Path Traversal), P8-006 (CSRF) | Directory deletion |
+| POST /instances/{id}/activate | P8-001 (MOTD injection chain) | Docker container start |
+| POST /instances/{id}/world/regenerate | P8-004 (Properties Injection), P8-006 (CSRF) | server.properties injection |
+| GET /instances/{id}/edit | P8-009 (RCON password exposure) | Sensitive data leak |
+| POST /players/*/add, /players/*/remove | P8-002 (RCON command injection), P8-006 (CSRF) | 6 endpoints |
+| POST /instances/{id}/mods | P8-003 (Path traversal via mod name), P8-010 (DoS), P8-006 (CSRF) | File write + DoS |
+| POST /instances/{id}/mods/{mid}/delete | P8-003 (Path traversal), P8-006 (CSRF) | File delete |
+| POST /instances/{id}/mods/rescan | P8-010 (DoS), P8-006 (CSRF) | File read + validation |
+| GET /instances/{id}/world/export | P8-003 (Path traversal read) | File read |
+| POST /instances/{id}/world/import | P8-003 (Path traversal write), P8-006 (CSRF) | File write (ZIP) |
+| GET /backups/{id}/download | P8-003 (Path traversal read) | File read |
+| POST /instances/{id}/backups/create | P8-006 (CSRF) | File write |
+| GET /accounts, POST /accounts/* | P8-006 (CSRF) | Superuser operations |
+| POST /change-password | P8-006 (CSRF) | Password change via CSRF |
+| All authenticated routes | P8-005 (No session TTL) | Persistent session hijacking |
+| Session management | P8-005, P8-007 | No TTL, logout without auth |
+
+---
+
+## Missing Coverage / Gaps
+
+1. **No rate limiting** — `POST /login` has no brute-force protection (existing p4-005, not re-drafted here)
+2. **No CSRF on any POST** — universal issue (P8-006)
+3. **Flat authorization model** — any authenticated user can access any instance (by-design for single-user/small-team)
+4. **No audit logging** — no record of state-changing operations (existing p4-017)
+5. **No encryption at rest** — SQLite database unencrypted on disk (existing p4-021)
+6. **No backup restore functionality** — `restore_backup` is a stub (existing p4-024)
+7. **Cookie without Secure flag** — missing when behind HTTPS proxy (existing p4-009)
+
+---
+
+## Recommendations (Priority Order)
+
+1. **CRITICAL: Sanitize instance name** — validate against `^[a-zA-Z0-9_-]+$` before filesystem use
+2. **HIGH: Strip newlines from Docker env vars** — sanitize MOTD and all user-controlled fields before Docker env injection
+3. **HIGH: Validate RCON usernames** — restrict to `[a-zA-Z0-9_]` (3-16 chars) before command construction
+4. **HIGH: Add CSRF protection** — SameSite=Strict cookie + CSRF tokens or origin validation
+5. **HIGH: Remove RCON password from edit form** — expose only to superusers
+6. **HIGH: Escape seed value in server.properties** — reject newlines and control characters
+7. **MEDIUM: Add server-side session TTL** — filter sessions by `created_at > datetime('now', '-1 day')`
+8. **MEDIUM: Move logout behind require_auth** — defense-in-depth
+9. **MEDIUM: Add timeout to mod validation** — prevent DoS via crafted JARs
+10. **LOW: Use OsRng for RCON password** — cryptographic PRNG for secrets